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Abstract 
On July 1 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) changed its pre-market opening 
auction system from an entirely black box into a more transparent system with indicative 
auction prices, indicative equilibrium volume and indicative unexecuted volume 
disseminated in real time throughout the pre-opening period.  This paper use the natural 
experiment offered by SHSE to investigate the impact of opening call transparency on 
market liquidity.  The dynamics of the opening process and its impact on trading activity 
for the rest of the day is of interest to traders because traders can either cluster their trades 
during the non-trading period or withhold their orders until the market opens.  We find 
that following the introduction of transparency to the call auction process, there is 
increased participation during the call auction and reduction in the volume of orders 
placed in the continuous market.  Uncertainty is eased, resulting in lower price volatility 
and narrower proportional bid-ask spreads.  But we find it to be detrimental to the 
liquidity and spreads of thinly traded stocks.   
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This study examines the impact of a transparency regime change that took place on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and is unique in two ways.  Firstly, it examines a system 
that moved from an opaque ‘black-box’ to a semi-transparent state.  Secondly, the 
alteration in information transparency is during the pre-opening call auction phase.  There 
have been no empirical papers that studied the impact of such change on market liquidity.   
According to Huisman and Koedijk (1998), the transparency regime of a trading 
mechanism is directly reflected in the operational performance of financial markets and 
in fundamental market variables such as liquidity and price efficiency.  These 
transparencies exist in two dimensions: pre-trade transparency (which concerns the flow 
of information before a transaction occurs) and post-trade transparency (the 
dissemination of trade price and volume of completed transactions).  The regime change 
on the SHSE is concerned with the former type.    
There is large body of research on the pre-trade information transparency of 
continuous markets but the academic literature has produced mixed findings.  This is 
possibly due to the differing designs of the exchanges, and due to the varying degrees of 
transparency between exchanges.   
Studies that find a direct relationship between pre-trade information transparency and 
liquidity improvement have generally explained it as a result of pre-trade transparency 
reducing search cost for traders, the savings of which are then passed to their posted 
quotes or orders.  Transparency also makes traders more confident about their limit 
orders, since adverse selection risk is reduced.  (Flood, Huisman, Koedijk and Mahieu 
1998, Pagano and Roell 1996, Biais 1993, Boehmer, Saar and Yu 2005) 
But there are also studies that have pointed to the contrary; pre-trade transparency can 
be detrimental to liquidity.  Madhavan et al (2005) found that after the Toronto Stock 
Exchange publicly disseminated the contents of its limit order book on the traditional 
floor and automated trading system, the spread widened and volatility increased.  Another 
empirical paper, Bortoli, Frino, Jarnecic, and Johnstone (2006), examined the impact 
after Sydney Futures Exchange increased the level of order book disclosure from best bid 
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and ask prices to depth at the best three prices.  They found that whilst there was no 
significant change to spread, market liquidity diminished as limit order traders began 
charging market order traders a premium for execution quality by withdrawing depth 
from the best quotes.  It seems that too much pre-trade transparency makes traders 
reluctant to place limit orders and therefore face the risk of being ‘picked off’.  
(Bloomfield O’Hara 1999, Flood et al 1999).  This is especially acute in illiquid markets 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 1999, Pagano and Roell 1996, Madhavan 1995, 1996, Baruch 
2005, Rindi 2007). 
Most studies that examined stock market transparency thus far have adopted either a 
theoretical or empirical approach.  Both approaches have unique flaws according to 
Huisman and Koedijk (1998).  Under a theoretical approach, it is not possible to construct 
a theoretical model of an exchange where there is a multitude of trader interacting 
without making behaviour-restricting assumptions about the market.  But under an 
empirical approach, whilst there is no need to make those assumptions, it is very complex 
to detangle the effects of transparency from other changes occurring in the market at the 
time.   
The comparison of results from varying studies is made additionally difficult by 
markets having different designs and different existing levels of transparency.  The 
majority of event studies in the area have examined markets with already some level of 
information transparency.  As such, the impact after an additional increase in 
transparency has tended to be minor.  On the SHSE, the change in transparency level of 
the opening call auction is significant because the market was previously a ‘black box’.   
The issue of how changes in market design affect liquidity is important enough to 
merit further investigation from both an academic and regulatory standpoint, especially 
when both theoretical predictions and empirical evidence are inconsistent. 
In this study, we find that following the introduction of transparency to the call 
auction process, there is an increased participation during the call auction and a reduction 
in the volume of orders placed in the continuous market.  Uncertainty is eased, resulting 
in lower price volatility and narrower proportional bid-ask spreads.  But we find call 
auction transparency to be detrimental to the liquidity and spreads of thinly traded stocks.   
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(The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutional details of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Section 3 presents the details on our 
data and sample. The empirical results are then presented and discussed in Section 4. 
Finally, our conclusion is discussed in the last section. 
 
2. Institutional Details: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
The trading system in the SHSE is based on the electronic Consolidated Open Limit 
Order Book (COLOB).  A 10-minute opening call auction is held at 09:15 and ends at 
09:25.  This is followed by two continuous auction sessions, the morning session from 
09:30 to 11:30 and the afternoon session from 13:00 to 15:00. Continuous trading is 
conducted through the submission of limit orders. These orders are matched in price then 
time priority. All orders are purged from the order book overnight.  
While no special trading mechanism is used to close the morning session or open the 
afternoon session, a special mechanism is used at the close of the afternoon session. 
Closing prices of the stocks of the trading day are generated by taking a weighted average 
of the trading prices of the final minute of each trading day. The information of the best 
five offers and bids and their associated volume as well as the price and volume for the 
latest transaction on the stock exchanges during the continuous trading sessions must be 
displayed on computer terminals viewable by investors on and off both exchanges. The 
market is closed on Saturdays and Sundays and other public holidays announced by the 
exchange. 
There are no designated dealers (specialists) to intervene in trading in the market. 
Investors place their orders with the brokers in the form of either a market order or limit 
order, and only good-to-day limit orders are accepted by the trading system2. At the end 
of the trading day, all orders are purged from the COLOB. The minimum tick sizes for all 
stocks are 1 cent (RMB0.01 Yuan). Shares cannot be sold on the same day as they are 
bought. The minimum trading size for purchase is 100 shares, while there is no minimum 
requirement for selling shares. Floor trading among member brokers, and short selling are 
strictly prohibited. During trading sessions on the SHSE, a stock is allowed to trade at a 
                                                 
2 Market order was introduced in 17 August 2006 in the SHSE.  
 5
price plus or minus 10% from the previous day’s closing price in order to avoid sharp 
price increases caused by ‘buy manias’ and sharp declines caused by ‘sell panics’. 
On July 1 2006 a new call auction is introduced to open trading. In the past, SHSE 
closes its order book over the pre-open period. There was also no information regarding 
order books available to investors during the auction process, except for the final clearing 
price generated at the end of the auction. Therefore, the pre-open call auction was entirely 
devoid of information dissemination. During this 10-minute call auction period, investors 
could place limit orders and participate in the opening auction, but no orders would be 
allowed to be withdrawn. Orders that are not executed in the opening auction were 
automatically transferred to the period of continuous trading. The determined opening 
price at 09:25 is continued to 09:30.   
On July 1 2006, a limit transparent call auction is introduced to open trading. 
Information of an indicative auction price (IAP), an indicative equilibrium volume 
indication (IEV), expecting unexecuted volume indication (IUV) 3 are disseminated to the 
market in real time through the pre-open period although the order book is not yet open to 
the market.   It is hoped that by providing pre-trade information during the opening 
period, the SHSE can increase its efficiency in determining an opening price and will 
encourage more investors to participate during the pre-opening auction.   
There are two relevant time periods in the 10-min pre-open call auction period. 
During the first period between 09:15-09:20, allowable messages to the system include 
limit orders and order modifications or cancellations. During the second period between 
09:20-09:25, modifications and cancellations are not allowed, but new orders are 
accepted before the final opening price and quantity was generated in the market.  The 
market then takes five-minute break between the periodic auction at 09:25 and the start of 
the morning session at 09:30 with continuous trading mechanism. The arrangement of 5-
minute cooling-off period is similar to the 2-minute blocking period between 09:58 and 
10:00 in the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited after 2002 (Asian Etrading 
2009). The situation in Shanghai‘s current pre-opening arrangement is now similar to the 
                                                 
3 The IAP is an indication of the call auction price if the auction was held at that instant. The IEV and IUV 
indicate the volume of shares that will execute and unexecuted at the IAP.  
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Deutsche Borse AG, which discloses information about unbalanced amounts but is a 
closed order book during opening call auction. 
 
3. Data and sample 
The data used in this study are obtained from the Reuters database maintained by the 
Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The data comprises of 
trades and the best bid and ask quotes for all stocks in the Shanghai A-share Index. 
Details of all trades and changes in best bid and ask prices are time stamped to the nearest 
second. 
A period of three months before and after the disclosure of partial order information 
in the opening call auction of the SSE is used in the study for analysis.  This gives us a 
sufficient window to capture the immediate as well as the permanent effect of the change 
in opening call auction transparency.   
Initially, all stocks in the Shanghai A-share index are sampled.  The Shanghai A-
share index is of particular interest as it accounts for a substantial proportion of total 
Shanghai trade volume and market capitalization. The A-shares consists of 891 stocks as 
at 31 December 2006, and accounts for around 95% of the total market capitalization of  
listed stocks including both A and B-shares. Seventy stocks are excluded from the sample 
due to their inactive trading during this period, reducing the sample size to 821 stocks.  
And then stocks which underwent share splits during the 2006 are also removed from the 
sample.  The final stock sample size is 216. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Effect on the first hour of trading 
Due to the build up of information during the overnight non-trading period, 
information asymmetry is greatest at the start of each trading day.  Thus the impact of the 
dissemination of indicative opening prices and opening volumes under an efficient 
market is expected to be most greatly felt during the first hour of trading.  It bears 
influence on traders' decision whether to cluster their trades during the non-trading period 
or to withhold their orders until the market opens.  Call auctions are sometimes desirable 
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to traders since it can absorb the market impact of liquidity shocks (Barclay et al 2008) 
and reduce asymmetric information problems by providing all traders with access to the 
same price (Madhavan 1992).   
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics 
From the pre-event and post-event data, we compute separately the average values of 
proportional bid ask spread, average depth (measured by the sum of the best bid and ask 
volume), and average time within trades, for each stock at every one minute interval 
between 0930 and 1030.  We also compute for each sample stock the average number of 
transacted trades during the first hour, average price volatility (standard deviation), and 
the average ratio of transacted call volume to trade volume during the first hour, of the 
first hour of each trading day.  Figures for the pre-event period are subtracted from the 
values for the post-event period in order to run nonparametric wilcoxon signed rank tests 
on the difference and assess whether the changes are statistical significant.  Table 1 
reports the descriptive statistics for the pre-event period, post-event period and the 
difference in computed values between the two periods.   
[insert Table 1 here] 
Wilcoxon signed rank p-values report that the difference is significant across all 
variables.  We find that spread is narrowed but there is also a decrease in the level of 
depth in the market, reduced number of trades in the first hour and there is a longer 
average wait between trades.  The simultaneous decline in spread and liquidity in the 
market can be explained by an increase in transacted volume during the opening call 
auction.  Traders who otherwise waited to submit their orders when the market opens for 
continuous trading are now more inclined to place their orders for trade during the pre-
opening call auction phase.  With an improved information disclosure, there is lower 
adverse selection risk and less price uncertainty.  The market responds to the information 
transparency by narrowing the spread between proportional bid and ask quotes.  Price 
certainty is also evidenced by lower price volatility.   
It is suggested that increased transparency during the opening call auction will 
influence trading behaviour differently according to stock liquidity.  Thinly traded stocks 
have more information asymmetry so a change in transparency regime will have a greater 
impact on those securities. (Comerton-Ford and Rydge, 2006).  Madhaven et al (2005) 
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report that illiquid stocks are adversely affected by increased pre-trade transparency for it 
discourages traders from placing their orders for fear of revealing their information.  The 
absence of orders at the open may impair liquidity and subsequent price discovery.  
To see how the impact of transparency varies with stock liquidity, Shanghai A-shares 
that actively traded during the study period are divided into roughly equal quintiles based 
on average daily turnover.  Quintile one represents the most actively traded stocks, while 
quintile five represents the least active stocks traded on the Shanghai stock exchange 
during our sample period.  The results from the univariate analysis are presented in table 
2.    
[insert Table 2 here] 
The results confirm Madhaven et al (2005)’s view that thinly traded stocks are 
adversely affected by information transparency.  Quintile 5 is the only sample group 
where the average proportional spread increased after the change.  Inactive stocks, which 
already have long time lags between trades, experience the largest increases in time 
between trades.   
There is no discernable pattern in the change to depth measures but quintile 2 and 
quintile 4 suffer the greatest decline in order book depth.  However, whereas one would 
expect the opening call auction would be less appealing to traders in inactive stocks after 
the transparency change, the ratio of call auction volume to continuous trade volume 
grew for thinly traded stocks.  This ratio increase is contrary to a priori expectations and 
may be driven by an even greater decline in the order book volume and depth of illiquid 
stocks when the market fully opens.    
 
4.1.2. Regression analysis 
Although the univariate results indicate a significant reduction in both proportional 
bid ask spreads and depth in the first hour when the opening call auction moves to a more 
transparent state, other factors affecting spread and depth could also account for those 
results.  Harris (1994) and McInish and Wood (1992) identified price volatility as a 
significant factor that influences market depth and bid-ask spreads respectively.  It is 
necessary to control for changes in these variables affecting spread and depth by 
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estimating the following regressions using pooled data three months before and three 
months after the regime change: 
 
pbasit = β0 + β1*dollar depthit +  β2 *volatilityit+ β3* changeit +  five-minute time 
interval dummies + εit (1) 
dollar depthit = γ0 + γ1*pbasit  +  γ2 *volatilityit *+ γ3* changeit + five-minute time 
interval dummies + εit (2) 
 
where dollar depth is the sum of the best bid-ask volume multiplied by its respective 
market price at that particular point in time.  pbas is the proportional quoted best bid and 
ask spread.  Since prices follow a random walk, volatility is expressed via Parkinson 
(1980)’s volatility measure4.  Change is a dummy variable that takes a value of one after 
the change to the opening call system, and a value of zero if otherwise.  Also included are 
11 five-minute time interval dummies for the first hour of trading, to capture the time 
varying characteristics of these liquidity measures. 
Table 3 presents the OLS coefficient estimates, test statistics and adjusted R-squared 
values for each equation.  The change variable in both equations are statistically 
significant and negative, which rejects the null hypothesis that call auction transparency 
change have no effect on the spread and depth of the market, at all conventional levels.  
This result is consistent with the findings from the univariate analysis.  In terms of the 
liquidity of the market during the first hour, call auction transparency alleviates some of 
the high bid-ask spread at market opening and at the same time reduces order book depth 
in the market.  Coefficient estimates for the rest of the controlling variables are 
significant and are of the expected signs.   
[insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Effect on intraday liquidity 
Empirical studies have typically identified either a U-shaped5 or L-shaped6 pattern in 
intraday spreads.  U-shaped spread patterns feature a gradual fall in spread after the session 
                                                 
4 [lnSH-lnSL]2/4ln2 x100%  where SH is the daily high price and SL is the daily low price 
5 McInish and Wood (1992), Chan, Fong, Kho, and Stulz (1996)), Lehman and Modest (1994).   
6 Chan et al. (1995a), Chan et al. (1995b).  For China, this pattern was noticed by Tian and Guo (2007). 
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opening and a gradual rise towards the daily closing.  Intraday spread patterns are L-shaped 
if they open with relatively high spreads but this spread either remains constant or 
declines over the remainder of the trading day.  Stock exchanges that rely on a specialised 
or designated dealer system for the provision of liquidity typically exhibit U-shaped 
spread patterns while exchanges that are based on multi-dealer systems generally exhibit 
L-shaped spread patterns. (Brockman and Chung 1999).  In addition to spread, trading 
volume and volatility have also been found to be U-shaped7.   
Intraday liquidity flows are of concern to the investment strategy of portfolio 
managers, traders, and regulators.  An understanding of liquidity patterns help market 
participants to decide on timing of their transactions within the day and better manage trading 
costs.  The morning and closing periods, with its higher than average level of trading activity, 
is more desirable for traders who regard execution speed as an important criteria in execution 
quality and less desirable for traders looking to minimise price variation.  
China’s intraday liquidity pattern may differ from the abovementioned studies 
because it has a one and a half hour trading break in the middle of the day.  Thus the 
purpose of this section of the paper is two-fold.  Firstly, to observe whether the U-shaped 
liquidity pattern holds for the Shanghai stock exchange; whether the liquidity in the 
morning and afternoon trading sessions are symmetrical.  Secondly, to test for sensitivity 
of these intraday patterns to a change in the level of information transparency.   
To analyse the intraday behaviour of various liquidity and trading activity measures, 
we partition each trading day into 5 minute intervals and compute the average values for 
each time interval five trading days before and five trading days after the opening call 
auction transparency regime change.  Twenty-eight stocks that had trading suspended due 
to abnormal fluctuations during this sample period8 were removed.  The ten-day time 
frame captures immediate impact of the change and minimises the possibility of other 
changes in market conditions that might affect these liquidity measures.   
Table 4 and 5 presents the results for the average proportional spread, depth, volatility, 
volume and proportional volume values for each of the time intervals in the pre and post-
event periods respectively.   
[insert Table 4 here] 
                                                 
7 Cheung et al. (1994), Chang et al. (1993)  
8 On the SSE, these suspended stocks resume trading the following trading day at 10:30am. 
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[insert Ta ble 5 here] 
Fig 1 graphs the L-shaped intraday pattern of the average proportional spreads.  The 
opening spread is about 1.7 times the proportional spread for the rest of the day.  Except 
for a slight peak at 1pm, proportional spread declines at a monotonically decreasing rate 
throughout the trading day.  Opening proportional spread after the change to the 
transparency of opening call auction is lower.  Proportional spread is overall lower after 
the event.   
[insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 2 depicts the intraday depth pattern in the market.  Depth is considerably lower 
at the start of the day and climbs steadily during the morning session.  By the afternoon 
session, depth plateaus.  It drops slightly in the last 20 minutes before market close.  The 
effect of the regime change seems be less depth in the market during the first 45-minutes 
of trading.   
[insert Figure 2 here] 
Figure 3 depicts the intraday volatility pattern in the market.  It displays an inverse J-
shape pattern.  Intraday volatility overall is higher in the post event period but in the first 
hour of trading, post-event volatility is smoother and generally lower.     
[insert Figure 3 here] 
Due to a trading break in the middle of the day, intraday volume on the Shanghai 
exchange shows an asymmetric double-U pattern, as displayed in figure 4 and 5.  Except 
for the spikes at the start and end of the session, absolute and proportional volume is 
relatively flat during the morning session.  By contrast in the afternoon trading session, 
proportional volume trend in an upward direction.  Absolute volume in the post-event 
period is larger than in pre-event period, but proportional volume is lower in the post-
event period across almost all time intervals.   
[insert Figure 4 here] 
[insert Figure 5 here] 
5. Summary and conclusion 
The call auction market competes with the continuous market for order flow.  
Whereas trading activity in call auctions generally improved after the veil was lifted from 
 12
SSE’s pre-opening process, depth, volume and trading activity during the continuous 
trading period is diminished, at least during the first hour of the market opening.  As well 
as the movement of order flow from the continuous to the pre-opening period, the 
dissemination of pre-trade information during that period reduces the impetus for traders 
to actively place orders to ‘test’ the market and bring about a faster price discovery in the 
early moments of trading (Flood 1999).  The higher certainty with which traders regard 
the opening price is evidenced by a lower average price volatility and narrower spread for 
the whole day.  Overall, opening call auction transparency is beneficial to the quality of 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
A direction for future research is to investigate whether the narrowing of spread at the 
open of trading is consistent with inventory management and asymmetric information 
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Descriptive Statistics for three months before and after July 2006 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the number of trades, proportional spread (pbas), depth (sum 
of best bid and ask volume), time within trades (seconds), volatility (standard deviation) and the ratio of 
transacted call volume to trade volume during the first hour, of the first hour of each trading day, for three 
months before and three months after July1 2006.  The stocks in the sample are included in Shanghai’s A-
share index and did not undergo a share split during 2006.  The p-value of the wilcoxon signed rank test 
reports whether the change in those mean values between the pre and post-event period are statistically 
significant.   
  Pre Post Difference 
Number of stocks 216 216 0 
Number of trades in the first hour   
 Mean 229.1802 159.3638 -69.8164 
 Median 211.1411 144.3462 -63.4219 
 S.D. 107.6138 83.30261 62.12802 
 P-value wilcoxon signed rank test of the change in the average  <.0001 
Pbas (%) 
 Mean 0.003611 0.003639 0.00003 
 Median 0.003201 0.003207 -0.00008 
 S.D. 0.00184 0.00209 0.00102 
 P-value wilcoxon signed rank test of the change in the average  <.0001 
Depth  
 Mean 55110.9 44870.28 -10240.6 
 Median 34667.24 26573.98 -6524.5 
 S.D. 80666 69217 31956 
 P-value wilcoxon signed rank test of the change in the average  <.0001 
time within trades (seconds) 
 Mean 19.81015 29.22611 9.415964 
 Median 16.87288 24.55972 7.209027 
 S.D. 11.53129 17.97397 10.88186 
 P-value wilcoxon signed rank test of the change in the average  <.0001 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during the first hour 
 Mean 0.029752 0.026426 -0.00333 
 Median 0.01503 0.01752 0.00191 
 S.D. 0.05989 0.03062 0.06201 
 P-value wilcoxon signed rank test of the change in the average  <.0001 
Volatility (standard deviation) 
 Mean 0.048757 0.037641 -0.01112 
 Median 0.034212 0.028682 -0.00588 
 S.D. 0.04957 0.02942 0.02821 





Descriptive Statistics for three months before and after July 2006, sorted into quintiles 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the number of trades, proportional spread (pbas), depth (sum of best bid and ask volume), time within trades (seconds), 
volatility (standard deviation) and the ratio of transacted call volume to trade volume during the first hour, of the first hour of each trading day, for three months before 
and three months after July1 2006.  Actively traded A-shares are sorted into quintiles according to their average daily turnover during the study period.  The p-value of 
the wilcoxon signed rank test reports whether the change in those mean values between the pre and post-event period are statistically significant.   
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change Pre Post Change 
Number of stocks 162 162  161 161  161 161  160 160  162 162  
Number of trades in the first hour 
 Mean 396.7847 299.1392 -97.646 287.0489 205.8751 -81.1738 237.5959 173.5623 -64.0335 185.8068 141.1546 -44.6522 136.1883 92.77703 -43.4113 
 Median 399.0907 293.3944 -107.505 287.3818 203.8281 -96.3675 239.2692 171.3692 -71.0296 187.882 140.6797 -50.3898 136.4104 93.78846 -42.492 
 S.D. 86.15976 88.06191 86.9468 58.28793 59.71589 75.95109 52.49376 47.26481 66.04519 38.06042 43.59258 58.2468 41.06038 28.41415 38.74253 
 
P-value wilcoxon signed rank test 
of the change in the average    <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001   <.0001 
Pbas (%) 
 Mean 0.002412 0.002218 -0.00019 0.004053 0.002717 -0.00134 0.003289 0.003123 -0.00017 0.005344 0.003425 -0.00192 0.004443 0.00453 0.000087 
 Median 0.002069 0.001955 -0.00007 0.002554 0.002465 -0.00007 0.002902 0.002841 -0.00005 0.003262 0.00314 -0.00006 0.00391 0.00394 0.000054 
 S.D. 0.00141 0.000983 0.00104 0.0165 0.00107 0.01639 0.00218 0.00124 0.00202 0.01948 0.0013 0.01949 0.00229 0.00215 0.00162 
 
P-value wilcoxon signed rank test 
of the change in the average   <.0001    <.0001   <.0001   <.0001    <.0001 
Depth 
 Mean 153326.3 139273.7 -14052.6 101800 48149.63 -53650.3 57174.4 45934.61 -11239.8 90049.43 34403.35 -55646.1 35751.26 30329.14 -5422.12 
 Median 43850.6 38512.7 -5273.3 32057.9 28821.72 -4877.4 35222.9 30508.7 -3723.4 27289.3 25149.53 -2442.7 24537.41 19826.31 -3625.11 
 S.D. 515236 503677 140805 635026 71804 622259 142084 53023 136982 620567 29913 621784 35199 34547 29105 
 
P-value wilcoxon signed rank test 
of the change in the average   <.0001    <.0001   <.0001   <.0001    <.0001 
time within trades (seconds) 
 Mean 9.553546 13.19743 3.64388 13.05752 19.12134 6.063815 15.89475 22.66048 6.765731 20.05806 27.61909 7.561028 29.14278 41.38909 12.24631 
 Median 8.982709 12.22289 3.297392 12.45206 17.51074 5.561334 14.93809 20.74423 5.652711 18.94117 25.13278 6.523473 25.9177 37.23536 12.6218 
 S.D. 2.64699 4.98165 4.12497 3.09571 7.18933 6.71729 4.10531 9.6516 8.92021 4.68609 10.11651 10.4571 12.31234 15.98834 13.19064 
 
P-value wilcoxon signed rank test 
of the change in the average  <.0001    <.0001   <.0001    <.0001    <.0001 
Ratio of transacted volume from call auction to trade volume during the first hour 
 Mean 0.016196 0.014483 -0.00171 0.017412 0.017413 0.000001 0.017618 0.017362 -0.00026 0.022842 0.021054 -0.00179 0.036082 0.03771 0.001629 
 Median 0.011798 0.012877 0.00161 0.011749 0.014299 0.0015 0.013197 0.015048 0.0011 0.014705 0.016963 0.00232 0.016539 0.022735 0.003547 
 S.D. 0.01487 0.00618 0.01433 0.01755 0.01845 0.02165 0.01421 0.01146 0.0169 0.02954 0.01856 0.03335 0.06806 0.05551 0.0854 
 
P-value wilcoxon signed rank test 
of the change in the average  <.0001    <.0001   <.0001    <.0001    <.0001 
Volatility (standard deviation) 
 Mean 0.079799 0.053257 -0.02654 0.065401 0.048684 -0.01672 0.04812 0.035545 -0.01257 0.04292 0.034536 -0.00838 0.034513 0.028743 -0.00577 
 Median 0.053785 0.038777 -0.01533 0.047656 0.038616 -0.01091 0.036542 0.027336 -0.00779 0.034406 0.02816 -0.00857 0.029425 0.024632 -0.0041 
 S.D. 0.0766 0.05124 0.0375 0.06704 0.04219 0.03211 0.03847 0.02455 0.02156 0.02482 0.02468 0.01873 0.01808 0.01462 0.01207 
 
P-value wilcoxon signed rank test 






Regression results for spread and depth 
This table presents the regression results for 216 A-share stocks that did not undergo 
share splits during 2006.  Sample period is from 1 April 2006 to 30 September 2006.  
Pbas is the proportional bid-ask spread calculated by dividing the absolute spread by the 
bid-ask price mid-point.  Dollar depth is measured by multiplying the sum of the best 
bid-ask volume by its respective stock price.  Volatility is a Parkinson’s volatility 
measure.  Change is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of one if the observation is 
after 1 July 2006.  The remainder variables are dummy five-minute time interval 
variables to control for the time varying behaviour of pbas and dollar depth.   
Regression analysis of  spread (1) 
pbasit = β0 + β1*dollar depthit +  β2 *volatilityit+ β3* changeit + time interval dummies + εit  
Explanatory Variable Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 0.00479 486.10 
Dollar Depth -0.00017 -210.91  
volatility  0.238164 656.47 
Change  -0.00009 -53.21 
09:30 to 09:35 0.001292 294.07 
09:35 to 09:40 0.000585 137.04 
09:40 to 09:45 0.000269 62.75 
09:45 to 09:50 0.00012 27.90 
09:50 to 09:55 0.000053 12.28 
10:00 to 10:05 -0.00003 -7.60 
10:05 to 10:10 -0.00007 -15.79 
10:10 to 10:15 -0.00008 -18.98 
10:15 to 10:20 -0.00009 -21.17 
10:20 to 10:25 -0.00011 -24.45 
10:25 to 10:30 -0.00012 -26.92 
Adjusted R2  0.1133  
All variables are significant at 1% level 
Regression analysis of depth (2) 
dollar depthit = γ0 + γ1*pbasit  +  γ2 *volatilityit *+ γ3* changeit + time interval dummies + εit  
Explanatory Variable Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 289128.3 393.22 
Proportional Spread -4825099 -55.90 
volatility  1774835 21.59 
Change  -26465 -67.71 
09:30 to 09:35 -98942.9 -102.32 
09:35 to 09:40 -68413.2 -73.09 
09:40 to 09:45 -42617.4 -45.36 
09:45 to 09:50 -28281.9 -30.05 
09:50 to 09:55 -14313.5 -15.19 
10:00 to 10:05 6777.454 7.16 
10:05 to 10:10 11034.75 11.63 
10:10 to 10:15 20235.11 21.23 
10:15 to 10:20 26720.69 27.84 
10:20 to 10:25 31138.05 32.28 
10:25 to 10:30 39980.31 41.38 
Adjusted R2  0.0085  





5-minute interval intraday data five day before the regime change 
This table reports the mean values for proportional spread, depth, volatility, volume and 
proportional volume in each 5-minute time interval, five trading days before the regime 
change.  The sample size is 188 shares.  It excludes A-shares that experienced share splits 
during 2006, stocks that didn’t trade during the ten day period, and stocks that resumed 
trading at 10.30am.  Pbas is the proportional bid-ask spread calculated by dividing the 
absolute spread by the bid-ask price mid-point.  Depth is the sum of the best bid-ask 
volume.  Volatility is a Parkinson’s volatility measure.  Proportional volume is the actual 
volume transacted as a proportion of the daily volume for that stock, on that day.   
Time Proportional spread  Depth  Parkinson's volatility (%) Volume  Proportional volume 
9:30 0.00426 17935.34437 0.00717 7981.04660 0.00156 
9:35 0.00330 22890.72898 0.00313 6071.79327 0.00121 
9:40 0.00295 26099.52894 0.00245 5787.31277 0.00122 
9:45 0.00278 27736.00897 0.00234 6160.57306 0.00128 
9:50 0.00272 31246.45333 0.00192 6222.33316 0.00129 
9:55 0.00260 34162.21937 0.00171 6092.81683 0.00130 
10:00 0.00267 34139.66824 0.00175 6121.10752 0.00135 
10:05 0.00256 33603.63039 0.00144 5833.16769 0.00130 
10:10 0.00257 34573.16828 0.00161 6199.02780 0.00131 
10:15 0.00261 36000.08634 0.00181 6598.35867 0.00139 
10:20 0.00255 37408.80864 0.00178 5784.91555 0.00128 
10:25 0.00254 39556.91947 0.00120 5956.46382 0.00130 
10:30 0.00257 40105.32367 0.00148 6072.43969 0.00126 
10:35 0.00257 42704.36305 0.00109 5988.83961 0.00123 
10:40 0.00251 41348.26900 0.00101 6095.77521 0.00127 
10:45 0.00251 41728.70223 0.00104 5398.18486 0.00119 
10:50 0.00253 40684.75925 0.00098 5460.71614 0.00124 
10:55 0.00250 41856.45357 0.00138 5998.36476 0.00124 
11:00 0.00253 42697.09712 0.00090 5840.77919 0.00118 
11:05 0.00248 43094.36282 0.00090 6277.57253 0.00125 
11:10 0.00251 43771.97210 0.00091 6309.44848 0.00126 
11:15 0.00252 41670.77095 0.00101 6428.11170 0.00130 
11:20 0.00252 44493.59766 0.00089 6576.68326 0.00127 
11:25 0.00246 41943.84172 0.00093 5888.51697 0.00118 
13:00 0.00251 41656.25912 0.00110 8851.73432 0.00177 
13:05 0.00245 44972.46600 0.00080 5840.19055 0.00119 
13:10 0.00244 45676.55105 0.00085 5715.32127 0.00125 
13:15 0.00244 47248.35884 0.00082 5876.22314 0.00124 
13:20 0.00241 48871.31568 0.00093 5829.91866 0.00122 
13:25 0.00244 49299.51885 0.00090 5604.82152 0.00123 
13:30 0.00245 49155.26894 0.00083 5277.82384 0.00118 
13:35 0.00248 51123.39466 0.00089 5404.32223 0.00120 
13:40 0.00243 48637.67155 0.00097 5688.86964 0.00123 
13:45 0.00241 49213.49016 0.00083 5229.27295 0.00118 
13:50 0.00241 48757.43576 0.00085 5282.30683 0.00120 
13:55 0.00240 50050.26124 0.00075 5480.64051 0.00124 
14:00 0.00235 54660.84122 0.00074 5575.12215 0.00120 
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14:05 0.00240 54921.63330 0.00101 6061.36763 0.00128 
14:10 0.00239 51738.48081 0.00100 6385.24345 0.00130 
14:15 0.00241 51156.79226 0.00081 6219.92998 0.00134 
14:20 0.00243 53224.01689 0.00084 6034.19056 0.00131 
14:25 0.00245 52443.70308 0.00117 5870.42525 0.00134 
14:30 0.00242 52481.25625 0.00096 5978.52742 0.00136 
14:35 0.00244 56398.86439 0.00098 5853.51208 0.00139 
14:40 0.00241 61047.30956 0.00098 6360.52110 0.00138 
14:45 0.00240 58506.70981 0.00090 6414.33834 0.00141 
14:50 0.00240 53364.63717 0.00101 7165.40700 0.00160 





5-minute interval intraday data five day after the regime change 
This table reports the mean values for proportional spread, depth, volatility, volume and 
proportional volume in each 5-minute time interval, just five trading days after the regime 
change.  The sample size is 188 shares.  It excludes A-shares that experienced share splits 
during 2006, stocks that didn’t trade during the ten day period, and stocks that resumed 
trading at 10.30am.  Pbas is the proportional bid-ask spread calculated by dividing the 
absolute spread by the bid-ask price mid-point.  Depth is the sum of the best bid-ask 
volume.  Volatility is a Parkinson’s volatility measure.  Proportional volume is the actual 
volume transacted as a proportion of the daily volume for that stock, on that day.   
 
Time Proportional spread  Depth  Parkinson's volatility (%) Volume  Proportional volume 
9:30 0.00398 18571.10019 0.00682 8798.39764 0.00127 
9:35 0.00330 23119.20833 0.00455 6958.90976 0.00112 
9:40 0.00300 26175.79738 0.00275 6693.82151 0.00110 
9:45 0.00274 28734.33939 0.00206 7025.57486 0.00116 
9:50 0.00265 32178.45780 0.00180 6934.50092 0.00116 
9:55 0.00259 38552.18256 0.00189 7054.75758 0.00117 
10:00 0.00256 35140.88494 0.00185 6838.74775 0.00115 
10:05 0.00250 34213.92661 0.00170 6387.43299 0.00113 
10:10 0.00250 39479.59620 0.00144 6922.82508 0.00113 
10:15 0.00245 44127.31671 0.00127 6121.20160 0.00112 
10:20 0.00244 56993.82665 0.00120 6557.24273 0.00120 
10:25 0.00243 55516.49718 0.00120 6259.09916 0.00114 
10:30 0.00241 51728.11554 0.00120 6482.66929 0.00119 
10:35 0.00243 53209.87195 0.00120 5934.32326 0.00112 
10:40 0.00245 58040.57140 0.00111 5891.74411 0.00112 
10:45 0.00244 57943.91112 0.00107 5857.63956 0.00114 
10:50 0.00242 51057.92307 0.00130 6898.92503 0.00119 
10:55 0.00247 44574.64343 0.00125 6194.25816 0.00119 
11:00 0.00242 48528.33215 0.00112 6250.97127 0.00114 
11:05 0.00243 45907.31413 0.00116 6610.39843 0.00119 
11:10 0.00243 45143.45755 0.00105 6222.69752 0.00120 
11:15 0.00241 45566.43168 0.00121 6689.05518 0.00124 
11:20 0.00243 45455.03284 0.00105 6343.93834 0.00119 
11:25 0.00241 46563.47584 0.00103 5843.26544 0.00114 
13:00 0.00249 49879.02377 0.00112 8873.72049 0.00167 
13:05 0.00238 48450.52754 0.00097 5923.13222 0.00111 
13:10 0.00238 47077.31869 0.00090 5784.99764 0.00109 
13:15 0.00239 47423.80390 0.00090 5662.61932 0.00107 
13:20 0.00236 50446.36554 0.00085 5819.16501 0.00115 
13:25 0.00240 50368.92959 0.00082 6352.15502 0.00122 
13:30 0.00237 49476.62078 0.00088 5905.13578 0.00113 
13:35 0.00233 55161.11814 0.00083 6098.94173 0.00113 
13:40 0.00235 51811.03323 0.00126 7202.13005 0.00136 
13:45 0.00239 46655.49772 0.00124 6994.48775 0.00133 
13:50 0.00236 44807.38537 0.00129 6724.54380 0.00130 
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13:55 0.00241 46709.57268 0.00110 6266.12819 0.00123 
14:00 0.00237 45338.57645 0.00112 6158.53271 0.00120 
14:05 0.00234 48866.31282 0.00104 6397.73679 0.00120 
14:10 0.00236 50306.11521 0.00109 6578.98590 0.00129 
14:15 0.00235 49218.37156 0.00118 6522.72319 0.00132 
14:20 0.00236 48154.37670 0.00097 6425.59847 0.00125 
14:25 0.00232 49781.90712 0.00110 6355.50056 0.00122 
14:30 0.00233 48889.03478 0.00084 5938.38163 0.00123 
14:35 0.00232 49182.32405 0.00114 6420.05795 0.00130 
14:40 0.00234 52211.32906 0.00104 6562.70771 0.00135 
14:45 0.00233 52725.18395 0.00105 6615.84396 0.00137 
14:50 0.00231 51227.93939 0.00118 6889.37722 0.00143 






This figure depicts the average proportional bid-ask spread across each five-minute time 
interval for 216 A-share stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after 


































































This figure depicts the average depth across each five-minute time interval for 216 A-
share stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after 1 July 2006.  



































































This figure depicts the average volatility across each five-minute time interval for 216 A-
share stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after 1 July 2006.  





































































This figure depicts the average volume across each five-minute time interval for 216 A-





































































This figure depicts the average proportional volume across each five-minute time interval 
for 216 A-share stocks during five trading days before and five trading days after 1 July 








































































average proportional volume BEFORE average proportional volume AFTER  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
